What should it mean for an agent to know or believe an assertion is true with probability 0.99? Different papers [2, 6, 15] give different answers, choosing to use quite different probability spaces when computing the probability that an agent assigns to an event. We show that each choice can be understood in terms of a betting game. This betting game itself can be understood in terms of three types of adversaries influencing three different aspects of the game. The first selects the outcome of all nondeterministic choices in the system; the second represents the knowledge of the agent's opponent in the betting game (this is the key place the papers mentioned above differ); and the third is needed in asynchronous systems to choose the time the bet 1s placed. We illustrate the need for considering all three types of adversaries with a number of examples. Given a class of adversaries, we show how to assign probability spaces to agents in a way most appropriate for that class, where "most appropriate" is made precise in terms of this betting game. We conclude by showing how different assignments of probability spaces (corresponding to different opponents) yield different levels of guarantees in probabilistic coordinated attack.
Introduction
In nearly every field of research concerned with systems of interacting agents -be it distributed computing, artificial intelligence, or economics-people have found it useful to think about these systems in terms of knowledge.
In game theory, for example, a player's strategy typically takes into account the knowledge the player acquires about the other players' strategies. In all of these fields. an important subclass of interactions involve probability. For example, a player in a game might toss a coin in order to determine its next move. In such contexts, it is natural to find oneself reasoning-at least informally-about knowledge and probability and their interaction. This sort of reasoning is quite common in computer science, such as when reasoning about probabilistic primality testing algorithms.
Such an algorithm might guarantee that if the input n is a composite number, then, with high probability, the algorithm will find a "witness" that can be used to verify that n is composite. Loosely speaking, we reason, if an agent runs this algorithm on input~L and the algorithm fails to find such a witness, then the agent knows that n is almost certainly prime, since the agent is guaranteed that the algorithm would almost certainly have found a witness had n been composite. A number of recent papers have tried to formalize this sort of reasoning about knowledge and probability.
Fagin and Halpern
[2] present an abstract model for knowledge and probability in which they assign to each agent-state pair a probability space to be used when computing the probability, according to that agent at that state, that a formula p is true.l In their framework, the problem of modeling knowledge and probability reduces to choosing this assignment of probability spaces. Although they show that more than one choice may be reasonable. they do not tell us how to make this choice. One particular (and quite natural) choice is made in [6] and some arguments are presented for its appropriateness;~another is made in [15] and used to analyze interactive proof systems. It is not initially clear, however, which choice is most appropriate.
In this paper, we clarify the issues involved in choosing the right assignment of probability spaces. We argue that no single assignment is appropriate in all contexts:
The right way to think about these assignments is in terms of strategies for a betting game, and different assignments can be viewed as most appropriate in the contexts of betting against different opponents in this game. Thinking in terms of probability, the truth of a statement such as "event E will occur with probability a" depends on the assignment of probability spaces.
Thinking in terms of games, if the opponent can influence the occurrence of an event E in any way. then the truth of a statement such as "event E will occur with probability a" depends on the extent to which the opponent can influence E, and the success of any strategy depending on the occurrence of E depends on the power of the opponent. We establish a correspondence between assignments of probability spaces and powers of opponents, and hence estab- lish a correspondence between assignments and winning strategies in this betting game against these opponents.
We find, however, there is more to the betting game than just the opponent you are betting against. Roughly speaking, the setting in which the game is played is also of great importance.
We identify three aspects of the game and its environment that capture all that is relevant, and model them in terms of three types of adversaries, each playing a fundamentally different role. We briefly describe these adversaries and their roles here, and explore them in greater depth in the rest of the paper.
When we analyze probabilistic protocols, we do so in terms of probability distributions on the mns or executions of the protocol. When we say that a protocol is correct with probability 0.99, we are trying to say that the protocol will do the right thing in 0.99 percent of the runs. In fact, a statement like "0.99 percent of the runs" does not usually make sense, since we usually have probability distributions on subsets of the runs, but not on the entire set of runs. For example, consider any probabilistic primality-testing algorithm [21, 24] . For each fixed input (the number to be tested), the coins tossed during the algorithm induce a probability space on the set of runs of the algorithm with that input, but we do not have a distribution on the set of all runs because we are not willing to assume a distribution on the inputs. When we say that the algorithm works with probability 0.99, we really mean that for every choice of input the algorithm is correct in 0.99 of the runs with that input. The choice of input is a nonprobabilistic choice, and the coin tosses are probabilistic choices.
The role of the first type of adversa~in our framework is to distinguish between these two types of choices: This adversaxy factors out all nonprobabilistic choices in the system, so that for each adversa~the remaining probabilistic choices induce a natural probability distribution on the set of runs with that adversary. The probability on the runs can be viewed as giving us an a priori probability of an event. before the protocol is run. However, the probability an agent places on runs will in general change over time, as a function of information received by the agent in the course of the execution of the protocol. New subtleties arise in analyzing this probability. Consider a situation with three agents pl, pz, and pj. Agent p~tosses a fair coin at time O and observes the outcome at time 1, but agents p, and pz never learn the outcome.
What is the probability according to pl that the coin lands heads? Clearly at time O, before the coin is tossed, it should be 1/2. What about at time 1? There is one argument that says the answer should be 1/2. After all, agent pl does not learn any more about the coin as a result of its having been tossed, so why should its probability change? Another argument says that after the coin has been tossed, it does not make sense to say that the probability of heads is 1/2. The coin has either landed heads or it has not, so the probability of the coin landing heads is either O or 1 (although agent p, does not know which). This point of view appears in a number of papers in the philosophical literature (e.g., [18] and [25] ). Interestingly, the same issue arises in quantum mechanics, in Schrodinger's famous cat-in-the-box thought experiment (see [19] for a discussion). We claim that these two choices of probability are best explained in terms of betting games (assuming honest players). At time O, agent pl should certainly be willing to accept an offer from either p2 or p~to bet $1 for a payoff of $2 if the coin lands heads (assuming p, is risk neutral q). Half the time the coin will land heads and pl will be $1 ahead, and half the time the coin will land tails and p, will lose $1, but on average pl will come out even. On the other hand, pi is clearly not willing to accept such an offer from p~at time 1 (since pj can tell at time 1 whether it is going to win the bet, and since pj is presumably willing to offer the bet only when it will win), although p I is still willing to accept this bet from PZ. The point here is that if you do not want to lose money in a betting game, not only is your knowledge important, but also the knowledge of the opponent offering the bet. Betting games are not played in isolation! Thus, the role played by the second type of adversary in our framework is to model the knowledge of the opponent offering a bet to an agent at a given point in a run. We sometimes identify the opponent with an adversary of this type. One obvious choice of opponent is to assume you are playing against someone whose knowledge is identical to your own. This is what decision theorists implicitly do when talking about an agent's posterior probabilities [1a] ; it is also how we can understand the choice of probability space made in [61. By way of contrast, the choice in [15] corresponds to playing someone who has complete knowledge about the past and knows the outcome of the coin toss; this corresponds to the viewpoint that says that when the coin has landed, the probability of heads is either O or 1 (although you may not know which). A further complication arises when analyzing asynchronous systems. In this case, there is a precise sense in which an agent does not even know exactly when the event to which it would like to assign a probability is being tested (e.g., when a bet is being placed). Thus, we need to consider a third type of adversary in asynchronous systems, whose role is to choose this time. To illustrate the need for this third type of adversary, we give an example of an asynchronous system where there are a number of plausible answers to the question "What is the probability that the most recent coin toss landed heads?" It turns out that the different answers correspond to different adversaries choosing the times to perform the test in different ways. We remark that the case of asynchronous systems is also considered in [6] . We can understand the assignment of "confidence" made there as corresponding to playing against a certain class of adversaries of this third type. As the preceding examples suggest, each of the earlier definitions of probabilistic knowledge that appear in the literature can be understood as the "best" definition for a particular choice of adversaries.
On the other hand, we show that every choice of adversaries gives rise to a definition of probabilistic knowledge that is "best" for that choice. To make this precise, we formalize our intuition that the probability an agent assigns to an event is related to the payoff the agent is willing to accept in a betting game with an opponent. We define a particular betting game, and show that once we fix the choice of adversaries, there is a definition of probabilistic knowledge that is best in terms of doing as well as possible against an opponent whose knowledge is modeled by the second adversa~. We show how this definition corresponds to a strategy that enables the agent to break even (at least) in the game, and how any other definition with this properly corresponds to an overly conservative strategy that
Informally, an agent is said to be risk neutral if it is wilhng to accept all bets where its expected winnings are nonnegatwe.
assumes the opponent is more powerful than it really is. These results form the technical core of our paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
In the next section, Section 2,
we provide a formal model of a system of agents such as a distributed system. In Section 3, we consider the problem of putting a probability on the runs of a system; this is where we need the first type of adversary, to factor out the nondeterministic choices. In Section 4, we start to consider the issue of how probability should change over time. In Section 5, we consider the choices that must be made in a general definition of probabilistic knowledge.
In In Appendix A, we give the proofs of the results claimed in the paper, and in Appendix B, we discuss some interesting secondary observations related to the rest of the paper.
Modeling Systems
As the examples in the introduction show, the analysis of a probabilistic system typically depends on the choice of a probability distribution on the runs or executions of the system. In this section, we fix a model of computation that defines these runs, and in later sections we study the probability distributions associated with these runs. Our model is actually the model given in [12] A run. of the system is mapping r from times to global states. We assume for sake of convenience that times are natural numbers.
A system is a set W of runs, intuitively the set of all possible interactions of the system agents. We denote the global state at time k in run r by r(k), the local state of p, in r(k) by ri( k), and the state of the environment by r,(k). We refer to the ordered pair (r, k) consisting of a run r and a time k as a point. Later in the paper, we assume that the entire history of a run r up to time k is encoded in the environment's state in r(k). This allows us to think of the runs of a system in terms of a computation tree: Nodes of the tree are global states (and correspond to a set of points), and the paths in the tree are the runs of the system. We say that a run r' extends a point (r, k) if r and r' pass through the same global states up to time k; that is, r(k') = r'(k') for O s k' s k.
A fict is considered to be true or false of a point. We identify a fact p with the set of points at which p is true, and write (r, k) % q iff q is true at (r, k).Ĩ n a system &Z', a fact p is said to be a jiact about the mm if, given two points of the same run, p is either true at both points or false at both points. Similarly, a fact p is said to be a fact about the global state if, given two points with the same global state,~is true at both points or false at both points.
We now define what it means for an agent to know a fact p at a point (r, k) of a system W. Intuitively, r,(k) captures all of agent pi's information at (r, k). We say p, considers a point (r', k') possible at (r, k), and write (r, k) -, ( r', k' ), if p, has the same local state at both points; that is, if r,(k) = r~(k'). We usẽ (r, k) to denote {(r', k')l(r, k) -, (r', k' )}, the set of points agent p, considers possible at (r, k). Following
[13] (and many other papers since then), we say p, kHows q at (r, k ) if p is true at all points p, considers possible at (r, k). This means p, knows P at (r, k ) if p is guaranteed to hold given the information recorded in p,'s local state at (r, k). More formally, we denote the fact that p, knows q at (r, k) by (r, k) > Ar, p, and define (r, k) %K, p iff (r', k') R q for all (r', k') = .~(r, k). Although this definition of knowledge depends heavily on the system Y (.9 restricts the set of points an agent considers possible at a given point), the system will always be clear from context and we omit explicit reference to M in our notation.
Probability on Runs
In order to discuss the probability of events in a distributed system, we must specify a probability space. In this section, we show that in order to place a reasonable probability distribution on the runs of a system, it is necessary to postulate the existence of the first type of adversary sketched in the introduction. Consider the simple system consisting of a single agent that tosses a fair coin once and halts. This system consists of two runs, one in which the coin comes up heads and one in which the coin comes up tails. The coin toss induces a very natural distribution on the two runs: each is assigned probability 1/2. Now consider the system (suggested by Moshe Vardi; a variant appears in [6]) consisting of two agents, p, and p,, where p, has an input bit and two coins, one fair coin landing heads with probability 1/2 and one biased coin landing heads with probability 2/3. If the input bit is O, pl tosses the fair coin once and halts. If the input bit is 1. pl tosses the biased coin and halts. This system consists of four runs of the form (b, c), where b is the value of the input bit and c is the outcome of the coin toss. What is the appropriate probability distribution on the runs of this system? For example, what is the probability of heads?
Clearly the conditional probability of heads given that the input bit is O should be 1/2, while the conditional probability of heads given the input bit is 1 should bc 2/3. But what is the unconditional probability of heads? If we are given a distribution on the inputs, then it is easy to answer this question. If the input bit is 1. then with probability 1/2 the tour will land heads and a will be performed:
and If the input blt IS O. then with probability 1/2 the coin will land tails and a will be performed.
unfortunately. our "natural" distribution on the runs of' the system does not support this line of reasoning, since this distribution does not assign a probability to the set {(1, h), ((), f)} corre\pond-mg to the performance of a. In fact, if we could assign a probability to this set, then we would have to consider lt a measurable set. Using this lrrformzztlon. we could then prove that the sets {(1, h If the algorithm outputs "prime," therefore, it might seem natural to say that n is prime with high probability; but, of course, this is not quite right. The input n is either prime or it is not; it does not make sense to say that it is prime with high probability.
On the other hand, it does make sense to say that the algorithm gives the correct answer with high probability. The natural way to make this statement precise is to partition the runs of the algorithm into a collection of subsystems, one for each possible input, and prove that the algorithm gives the right answer with high probability in each of these subsystems, where the probability on the runs in each subsystem is generated by the random choices for a. Although for a fixed composite input n there may be a few runs where the algorithm incorrectly outputs "prime," in almost all runs it will give the correct output. In many contexts of interest, the choice of input is not the only source of nondeterminism in the system. Later nondeterministic choices may also be made throughout a run. In asynchronous distributed systems, for example, it is common to view the choice of the next processor to take a step or the next message to be delivered as a nondeterministic choice. Similar arguments to those made above can be used to show that we need to factor out these nondeterministic choices in order to use the probabilistic choices (coin tosses)
to place a well-defined probability on the set of runs. A common technique for factoring out these nondeterministic choices is to assume the existence of a scheduler deterministically choosing (as a function of the history of the system up to that point) the next processor to take a step (cf. [22, 26] ). It is standard practice to fix some class of schedulers, perhaps the class of "fair" schedulers or "polynomial-time" schedulers, and argue that for every scheduler in this class the system satisfies some condition.
As we now show, if we view all nondeterministic choices as under the control of some adversary taken from some class of adversaries, then there is a straightforward way to view the set of runs of a system as a collection of probability spaces, one for each adversary. By fixing an adversary, we factor out the nondeterministic choices and are left with a purely probabilistic system, with the obvious distribution on the runs determined by the probabilistic choices made during the runs. This is essentially the approach taken in [6].
Once we fix an adversary xl, we see view the runs of the system with this adversary as a (labeled) cor?ymtaticm tree Y-q (see Figure  1 ). As in Section 2, nodes of the tree are global states and paths in the tree are runs. Now, however, edges of the tree are labeled with positive real numbers such that for every node the values labeling the node's outgoing edges sum to 1. Intuitively, the value labeling an outgoing edge of node s represents the probability the system makes the corresponding transition from node s. Given a finite path in the tree, the probability of the set of runs extending this finite path is simply the product of the probabilities labeling the edges in this path. It is natural to view this computation tree Y7 as a probability space, a tuple (=,q,%~, I-LA), where~~is the set of runs in ti~,~q consists of subsets of WA that are measurable (i.e., the ones to which a probability can be assigned; these are generated by starting with sets of runs with a common finite prefix and closing under countable union and complementation), and a probability function~~defined on sets in %A so that the probability of the set of all runs with a common prefix is the product of the probabilities labeling the edges of the What is the most appropriate set of powers to assign to the adversary'? It depends on the application.
Probabilih at u Point
In the preceding section, we showed how to use the notion of an adversary to impose a meaningful probability distribution on the runs of a system. In order to define an agent's probabilistic knowledge at a given point, however. we seem to require a probability distribution on the points of the system, and not the runs. An agent's probability distribution on points must certainly be related to the distribution on runs if it is to be at all meaningful. As the preceding discussion shows, in a protocol which has a certain property P with high probability taken over the runs, an agent may still find itself in a state where it knows perfectly well that P does not (and will not) hold. Although correctness conditions P for problems arising in computer science have typically been stated in terms of a probability distribution on the runs, it might be of interest to consider protocols where an agent knows P with high probability at all points. As we shall show, the probability distribution on the runs typically corresponds to each agent's probability distribution at time O.
Thus, we can view the probability on the runs as an a priori probability distribution.
To require a fact (or a condition P) to hold with high probability from each agent's point of view at all times is typically a much stronger requirement than requiring it to hold with high probability over the set of runs. Arguably, in many cases, it is also a more natural requirement. It seems quite natural, for example, to require of a coordinated attack protocol that A have high confidence at all points that the attack will be coordinated, rather than allowing A to attack even when it is certain the attack will be uncoordinated.
Definitions of Probabilistic Ktlowledge
We want to make sense of statements such as "at the point c, agent p, knows p holds with probability a ." The problem is that, although we typically have a well-defined probability distribution on the set of runs in each computation tree, in order to make sense of such statements we need a probability distribution on the points p, considers possible at c. The reason we need a distribution on points and not just on runs is that many interesting facts are facts about points and not about runs. Consider, for example, the fact "the most recent coin-tossed landed heads." If a coin is tossed many times in a single run, say once every clock tick, this fact may be true at some points of the run and false at others, and hence is a fact about points and not about runs.
When reasoning about probabilistic protocols, it seems quite natural to want to make formal statements of the form "agent p knows with probability 1/2 that the most recent coin tossed by agent q landed heads"; this is not a fact about runs. If we restrict our attention to facts about runs, then we can make do simply with a distribution on runs, but this precludes (or at least complicates) the discussion of many interesting events in a system.
We begin by reviewing the general framework of [2] in which, given a particular assignment of probability spaces to points and agents, we can make sense of such statements about an agent's probabilistic knowledge.
The remainder of the paper will focus on the construction of appropriate probability assignments.
Define a probability assignment Y to be a mapping from an agent p, and point c to a probability space~,,, = (S,,.,~,., P,,.). Here S[,, is a set of points,~,~is the set of measurable subsets of S, ,, and p,,, is a probability function assigning a probability to the sets in 2?,,. w,, (S,., (P)) as the probability~is true. according to agent P, at the point C. One problem with this interpretation, of course, is that the set S,,(p) is not guaranteed to be measurable, and hence w,, ,( S1,.( q)) is not guaranteed to be well-defined.
In order to deal with this problem, we follow the approach of [2] , and make use of inner and outer measures. Given a probability space (S, t?, w), the inner measure p~and outer measure p" are defined by p*(S')= sup{v(T): T~S'and T= T},
T 2 S' and T q;2'} for all subsets S' of S. Roughly speaking, the inner (respectively, outer) measure of S[,'( q) is the best lower (respectively, upper) bound on the probability p is true, according to p, at c. It is easy to see that K*(T) = 1 -P* (T') for any set T, where T' is the complement of T. Given a probability assignment~, we write 9, c R Pr
Note that we need the probability assignment @ to make sense of Pr,. We take K~q to be an abbreviation for K1(Prl( q) > a); thus. K;p means that agent p, knows that the probability of p is at least a since Pr,( q) > a holds at all points p, considers possible. We now have all the definitions needed to give semantics to a logical language of knowledge and probability. however, we allow more than one point on the same run to appear m S,,,. As we shall see in the next section, this generality is useful when deahng with asynchronous systems,
x We remark that we can easily extend these definitions to more complicated formulas such as
'We define (r, k) R O@ Iff (r, k + 1) R q, so Op 1s true at time k m a run lff p ]s true at time k + 1, after the next step. We define (r, k) > q U~to mean there exists 1 z k such that (r,l) k @ and (~,1') s q for all 1' with k s P <1. Thus, p Uq!J N true at (r, k) lf @ is true at some point in the future, and q is true until then. Recall that Oq, which says that p IS true at some point m the future, can be taken as an abbreviation of true U p; and that u q, which says that p 1s true now and forever m the future, is an abbreviation for~O~p. We now have a natural way of making sense of knowledge and probability, given a probability assignment~. Unfortunately, we will do not know how to choose y>, but our choices are somewhat more constrained than they may at first appear. We are given the computation trees and the associated distributions on runs, and we clearly want the distribution on the sample space S,,. of points we associate with agent p, at point c to be related somehow to these distributions on runs. We next show that once we choose the sample spaces S,,,, there is a straightforward way to use the distribution on runs to induce a distribution on S,,.. Thus, once we are given an appropriate choice of sample spaces and the distributions on runs of the computation trees, we can construct the probability assignment.
The problem of choosing a probability assignment, therefore, essentially reduces to choosing the sample spaces. This reduction will clarify important issues in determining the appropriate choice of probability assignments.
The idea of our construction is quite straightforward: given a sample space S,,, and a subset S s S, ., the probability of S (relative to S,~) is just the probability of the runs going through S normalized by the probability of the set of runs going through S,,.. In other words, the probability of S is the conditional probability a run passes through S, given that the run passes through S,,.. In order for this simple idea to work, however, the set S, , must satisfy a few requirements.
One natural choice for S,,, is the set .~( c) of all points agent p, considers possible at c. In general, however, this set contains points from many different computation trees, and attempting to impose a distribution on this set of points leads to the same difficulties that led us to factor out nondeterminism and view a system as a collection of computation trees in the first place. Recall the example from Section 3 in which p~tosses a fair or biased coin, depending on whether its input is O or 1. Before (and after) the coin is tossed, Pz considers four worlds possible, one from each possible run. We can no more place a probability on these points than we could place a probability on the four runs. On the other hand, given a point c from a run with input bit 1 (corresponding to the biased coin), if we restrict S?,. to consist of the two points in the computation tree with input 1, then we can put a probablhty on the two points in the obvious way and compute the probability of heads as 2/3. This intuition leads us to require that each set S,, be contained entirely within a single computation tree:
REQl: All points of S,,, are in 9(c).
We remark that, while REQl does not allow us to take S,,, to be all of~(c), it still seems natural to choose S, , _ c&[(c).
We say that a probability assignment is consistent if it satisfies' this condition. As pointed out in [2], a consequence of this is that if p, knows q, then q holds with probability 1; that is, K,(p) = (Pr,( p) = l).]" With a consistent assignment, it cannot be the case that agent p, both knows p and at the same time assigns n p positive probability.
In order to use the construction described above to impose a distribution on the set S, ,, however, we must require more of S,,, than the single condition REQ1. Because this idea involves conditioning on the set of runs passing through S, ,, the definition of conditional probability forces us to require that this set of runs is a measurable set with positive measure. Suppose Y7C ) = ( Yq, .iKq, w~), for some adversary A. Given a set S of points contained in Ylc), denote by 9(S) the set of runs passing through S; that is, W(S) = {r q~q:
(r, k) = S for some k}. We require that
Note that REQ~implies REQ1. Nevertheless, REQ2 is a relatively weak requirement. For example, the next result shows that REQZ is always satisfied in practice.
A set S of points is said to be state generated if (r, k) G S and r(~) = r'(k' ) imply (r', k') = S: in other words, S contains all points with the same global state as (r. k).
If S,,, is state ge?lerated and satisfies REQ1, then S, , satisfies REQ: .
The proof of Proposition 1 (and all other technical results in this paper) can be found in Appendix A. We remark that this statement is actually independent of the transition probability assignment T assigning probabilities to the edges of J;. Although REQ~seems to depend on both S,,, and T, Proposition 1 tells us we can choose S, , without regard for T and be confident REQZ will be satistied for whatever 'T we eventually choose, as long as S, , is stated generated. Given a set of points S, c satisfying REQl and REQZ, we now make precise our idea for imposing a distribution on S, ,. Intuitively, to construct the collection .'7, , of measurable subsets of S, ,, we project the measurable subsets of the runs of Y7C) onto S, ,. Formally, given a set f,?' of runs and a set S of points, we define Proj(#', S) = {(r, k) = S: r E @'}. We define
we define the probability function p,,, on the measurable subsets of S,, via conditional probability: If S,,, satisfies REQI and REQZ, then P,,, is a probability space.
We can now formalize our intuition that the construction of probability assignments reduces to the choice of sample spaces. Given a system (i.e., a collection of labeled computation trees), define a sample space assignment to be a function~that assigns to each agent p, and point c a sample space Y( i, c) = S,,. satisfying REQ1 and REQZ. Given a sample space assignment S', our construction shows how to obtain a probability space 9, . for all agents p, and all points c. This naturally determines a probability ass~gnment~, which we call the probability assignment induced by P. We note that the definition of .~~actually depends on both the sample space assignment >' and the transition probability assignment~(implicitly determined by the fact that we have labeled computation trees). There are times when it is convenient to start with an unlabeled computation tree, labeled by some transition probability assignment~. In this case, we refer to 9 as the probability assignment induced by Y say h (the coin landed heads) and t (the coin landed tails). Consider the sample space assignment &l such that Yl(l, h) = @(1, t) = {h, t}. At both points h and t,the same sample space is being used;
and at both points, with respect to the induced probability assignment, the probability of heads is 1/2. Thus, p, knows that the probability of heads is 1/2. According to this choice of sample spaces, pl has not learned anything about the outcome of the coin flip at time 1, and the probability of heads at time 1 is the same as at time O. On the other hand, consider assignment~z such that &'z(l, h) = {h} and Y~(l, t) = {t}.With respect to the induced probability assignment, the probability of heads at h according to pl is 1, while the probability of heads at t is O. According to this choice of sample spaces, the coin has either landed heads or landed tails, so all that p~can say is that it knows that the probability of heads is either 1 or O, but it does not know which. Which is the right probability assignment? As we hinted in the introduction, the answer depends on another type of adversary, the one that p, views itself as playing against. This is the focal point of the next section. We conclude this section with one further example. Consider a system where a fair die is tossed by p, and pl does not know the outcome.
Suppose that at time 2 the die has already been tossed. Let c,, ..., cb be the SiX points corresponding to the possible outcomes of the die. What sample space assignment should we use for pz? One obvious choice is to take the assignment =1
that assigns the same sample at all six points, the space consisting of all the points. With respect to this sample space, each point will have probability 1/6. Let q be the statement "the die landed on an even number." Clearly, in the probability space induced by this sample space, p holds with probability 1/2.
Since pz uses the same sample space at all six points, agent pz knows that the probability of p is 1/2. A second possibility is to consider two sample spaces
let the assignment Y' assign the sample space S1 to agent pz at all the points in SI, and the sample space Sz at all the points in Sz. Thus, at all the points in S1, the probability of q is 1/3, while at all the points in Sz, the probability of T is 2/3. All pz can say is that it knows that the probability of q is either 1/3 or 2/3, but it does not know which. Clearly, we can subdivide the six points into even smaller subspaces. It is not too hard to show that the more we subdivide, the less precise is pz's knowledge of the probability.
( In a synclzro?zozls systenl, if Z is a consistent, staizdard a wig~llnent and 9(@) is state generated. tlzen p is nzeasarahle with respect to Y for all fact,s p =Y(Q).
This result says that for all practical purposes we do not have to concern ourselves with nonmeasurable sets and inner measures in synchronous systems.
The proof is by induction on the structure of p, and can be found in Appendix A.
We begin our examination of probability assignments in synchronous systems by defining four sample space assignments and their induced probability we have defined the probability assignments.
The first of these assignments corresponds to what decision theorists would call an agent's posterior probability. This is essentially the probability an agent would assign to an event given everything the agent knows. This intuitively corresponds to the bet an agent would be willing to accept from a copy of itself, someone with precisely the same knowledge that it has. We make this relationship between probability and betting precise shortly. What probability space corresponds to an agent's conditioning on its knowledge in this way? Since we have identified an agent pi's knowledge with the set of points p, considers possible at c, this set of points seems the most natural choice for the space. As we have seen, however, this set of points is not in general contained in one computation tree. Thus, we consider instead the set of points in c's computation tree~qc) that p, considers possible at c. This is just the set Tree,,, = {d c Y(c): c W, d}. It is clear that Tree,,. satisfies~Ql; that it satisfies REQZ follows by Proposition 1 since it is state generated. By Proposition 2, therefore, the induced probability space (Tree,,,,~,., w,,.) is indeed a probability space. Let &post be the sample space assignment that assigns the space Tree, , to agent p, at the point c, and let 9P0St be the probability assignment [nduced by &'POs'. The probability space~~st has a natural interpretation.
It is generated by conditioning on everything' p, knows at the point c and the fact that it is playing against the adversary A that generated the tree~q in which c lies. of course, the agent considers many adversaries possible. Thus, the statement '-Yp"st, c t= K,"P means that for all adversaries p, considers possible at c (given its information at c), the probability of p given all p, knows is at least a. WpO°i s precisely the assignment advocated in [2] in the synchronous case.
Suppose now that p, were considering accepting a bet from someone (not necessarily an agent in the system) with complete knowledge of the past history of the system. In this case, we claim that the appropriate choice of probability space for p, at the point c = (r, k) is all the other points (r', k) that have the same prefix as (r, k) up to time k; in other words, all points with the global state r(k). Call this set of points Pref,,.
Note that Pre~,, is independent of p,, and depends only on the point c. Moreover, Pref,. is clearly state generated (by r(k) itself), so by Propositions 1 and 2 we can again induce a natural probability distribution on this set of points by conditioning on the runs passing through Pref,~. Let &f"' denote the sample space assignment that assigns Prefi . to P, at c, and let @f"' denote the probability assignment induced by &'fut' We remark that this is the probability assignment used in [15] , as well as [17] .'
In the probability space @,~Ct, any event whose outcome has already been determined before reaching the point c will have probability either O or 1. Future events (that get decided further down the computation tree) still have nontrivial probabilities, which is why we have termed it a future probability assignment.
Let us reconsider yet again the coin-tossing example from the introduction, where agent pz tosses a fair coin at time 1 but agents p~and p~do not learn the outcome.
Since the coin has already landed at time 2, it is easy to check that we have Y*"c, c 1= K1(Prl(heads) = 1 V Prl(heads) = 0).
On the other hand, we have yap"", c K K1(Prl(heads) = 1/2).
Thus, .9 '"'t and @f"t correspond to the two natural answers we considered for the probability of heads. causes an agent to know the attack will be coordinated with high probability.
while knowing that the attack will not be coordinated! Although consistency seems a natural restriction on probability assignments, it is not a requirement of our framework. There may be technical reasons for considering inconsistent assignments. One obvious (although inconsistent) probability assignment associates with the point c = (r, k) the set of all time k points in its computation tree. Call this set All,,,.
(All,,, is, in fact, independent of p,.) The probability space induced by the construction of Proposition 2 in this case simulates the probability on the runs. Let us denote the associated sample space and probability assignments by &Pr'Or and Yap''')'. Notice that if p, uses the probability space~~f~'"', it is essentially ignoring all that it has learned up to the point c-up to time k in r-which is why we have termed it a prior probability.
All four of the sample space assignments we have constructed are standard assignments.
In fact, it is not difficult to see that any assignment constructed on the basis of some opponent's knowledge will be standard. This lends some justification to our restriction to standard assignments. We can view these four assignments as points in a lattice of all possible standard sample space assignments.
We define an ordering s on this lattice by Y" s S iff .$:, G S, , 12Note that Tree; , = Tree, . . In this sense, this construction can be wewed as a generalization of the previous one, but the sample space assignment J%' being defined here N not the same as y>~~st. For example, Tree; ' and Tree, , are chfferent Sample Spaces.
for every agent p, and point c. As usual, we write Y' < P when P' s P for In a synchronous system, if 9' and P are consistent, standard assign metlts satisfying @ <P, then for all agents p,, all points c, and all measurable subsets S' q ."Y: .: It follows that any consistent probability assignment can be obtained from = '"'t by conditioning.
We are now able to make precise the sense in which 9 P"'t, PJ, and &Ptut are the "right" probability assignments for an agent to use when playing against an opponent who knows exactly as much as it does, when playing against p], and when playing against an opponent who has complete information about the past. We focus on~~here, but the arguments are the same in all cases. Consider the following betting game between agents p, and pJ at a point c. For all facts p measurable with respect to PJ, all agents p,, and all points c, the rule Bet( p, a ) is @'J-safe for p, at c iff~J, c 1= K,"p.
We view this as the main result of our paper. The proof of Theorem 7 depends only on the fact that 91 is induced by S'l, and is actually independent of the particular transition probability assignmentd etermining the distribution on runs. In this sense, it is really Y1 that is determining what bets are safe for p, to accept. We can formalize this intuition as follows: We say that a standard sample space assignment 9 determines safe bets against pJ in a system consisting of unlabeled computation trees if, for all transition probability assignments T-assigning transition probabilities to edges of the computation trees, the following condition holds for the probability assignment 9 induced by 9 and T:
9, c > K,"p implies Bet( q, a ) is~J-safe for p, at c says that the only way for p, to be guaranteed it is using a safe betting strategy against p, is by assuming the opponent is at least as powerful as p,. Intuitively, the more powerful the opponent, the less confident the agent will be that it will be able to win a bet with this opponent, and the higher the payoff the agent will require before accepting a bet. Consequently, p, is being unduly conservative if it takes a probability assignment that corresponds to an agent that is more powerful than p, since it may pass up bets it should accept. 17
In the process of making this intuition precise, we can prove a theorem that gives us further insight into relationships between sample space assignments on the lattice. Recal I that we have defined Kl"q to mean agent p, knows a is a lo~vr bound on the probability of q. We can extend this definition to deal with intervals in a straightforward way. We would like to define K\U~lp to mean K,( a < Pr[( p ) s~), which should mean agent p, knows the probability of p is somewherl' IIetween a and /3. Since p may not correspond to a measurable set, what we really mean is that the inner measure of p is at least a and the outer measure is at most~. Since we interpret Pr, as inner measure when q does not correspond to a measurable set, and since~' (T) = 1 -~~( T' ) for any set T, we can capture this intuition in terms of our language by interpreting K~~.fi] q as an abbreviation for K,[(Pr,(q)) > a) A There is also a sense in which w P("t is the "right" assignment to use, provided we put the betting game we have been using into the system, as opposed to having it be external to the system; we discuss this issue in greater detail in Section B.3. Finally, #'P"S' is the probability assignment that corresponds to what decision theorists seem to use when referring to an agent's subjective (or posterior) probability. However, as we have seen, 9P0St may not always be the "right" probability assignment to use.
The right choice depends on the knowledge of the opponent offering us the bet in the system we wish to analyze. Although @ P"s' may give a smaller interval than 9J (intuitively giving sharper bounds on an agent's belief a fact is true), if p, uses the better lower bound from 9P0°as a guide to deciding what bet to accept from p,, itmay wind up losing money. In fact, it follows from Theorems 8 and 9 that 9J is the probability assignment that gives an agent the best interval and still guarantees a good betting strategy. Even in cases where @r"'t is the "right" choice, it is not necessarily the probability we want to use in computations. It may not always be necessary to obtain the sharpest interval of confidence possible. A rough bound may be sufficient.
Theorem 9 shows that proving a lower bound on an agent's confidence using a certain choice of probability space implies the same bound holds with any definition higher in the lattice. The advantage of using a probability assignment that lies lower in lattice is that, because the individual probability spaces are smaller, the computations may be simpler. Consider the definition 14Recall from Section 2 that a fact is identified with a set of points, and that a formula E a sentence in a logic that denotes a set of points (i.e., a formula expresses a fact). When we write p =9'(0), we mean that the fact p is expressible in the language -9 (0).
L@"t,for example. Here, the probability space we associate with a point (r, k) subsets of runs onto S~CSt, the sets iri %~c't are those consisting of all the points on some set of runs in the computation tree. Let p be the fact "the most recent coin toss landed heads," which is initially false at time O. Although this is a fact about the global state, the set of points where it is true is not a measurable subset of S~CSt, since it does not consist of all the points on some subset of runs. This already shows that Proposition 3 fails in this case. Thus, we cannot talk about the probability that p, knows p at a point c in the tree. We can talk about the inner and outer measure of S~~t( P), however. Since the only nonempty measurable set contained in S~~t( P) is the set of points on the single run in which the coin lands heads every time, the inner measure of this set is 1/210; similarly, the outer measure is 1 -(1/210).
Although
values such as 1/21" and 1 -(1/210) may seem somewhat strange at first glance, they are not totally unmotivated. Consider the situation of agent p~at a point c trying to figure out the probability of heads-the probability that p is true-given only the probability on the runs. Agent PI has no idea which run it is in. The only run in which it is always the case that the most recent coin toss landed heads is the run where the coin lands heads on every toss: this run occurs with probability 1/2'(). On the other hand, in all the runs except for the one in which the coin lands tails on every toss, it is possible that the most recent coin toss landed heads. Thus, in a set of runs of probability holds when the probability of q can range from a to~in the different probability spaces. In our current example, however, there is only one probability space; the interval arises because of the nonmeasurability of q. Depending on how "lucky" pl is in the choice of where in each run it tests for heads, the probability of getting heads could range from 1/21" to 1 -(1/21(').
We can view the nonmeasurability that arises dUe to asynchrony as a new element of uncertainty that an adversary can exploit. Intuitively, in the cointossing example, when p, plays against (a copy of) itself, since p, does not know where in the run it is, an adversary gets to choose that. On the other hand, when playing against pz, at least p, knows that all the worlds in a given sample space are time k points, for some fixed k. We can view our analysis where we obtain the answer 1/2 without invoking pj as implicitly assuming an adversary who chooses the time k the test for p is to be performed. Such an adversal~is an adversary of the third type mentioned in the introduction. Given any time k chosen by this adversary, the probability of p is 1/2. We can formalize this analysis as follows: With each time k we associate a separate computation tree corresponding to the adversary AL that chooses time k to test for the truth of a fact, in our case for the truth of p. The probability space for p, at each point in the tree corresponding to A~consists of the time k points in the tree, each of which is assigned equal probability.
In each of these probability spaces, the probability of heads is 1/2, so p, knows that the most recent coin toss landed heads with probability 1/2.
There is no reason, however, to restrict this third type of adversary to simply making an initial choice of the stopping time. Suppose we have fixed a collection of adversaries of the first type (the computation trees) and an adversary of the second type (say p]). We define a cut through Tree!,. to be a subset of Tree: , containing precisely one point from every run passing through Tree; ,: every run passing through Tree! , is cut precisely once by such a set of points. We define a type three adversa& to be a function mapping an agent p, , . Intuitively, p, and p, are betting on a and a point c to a cut through Tree; , fact p, but neither knows precisely where in the run the bet 1s taking place; it is the third type of adversa~who determines where in the run the bet is actually made. The cut through Tree;~chosen by the adversary is the set of points at which the adversary will cause the bet to take place when the local states of p, and pJ are given by c. In the example above, when pl plays against a copy of itself, the adversary chooses one cut per computation tree, since pl considers all points in the computation tree possible. In the case of p~playing against pz (who knows the time), the adversary chooses one cut for every time k; this cut must in fact consist of all time k points in the tree. all choices of C = % except that we put C into the environment state at each point in~, c. The sample space assignment~c maps an agent p, and a point c of a tree SA,~to a sample space S,~C c Tree~,~such that for each run r = W( Tree:,, ), exactly one point (r, k) = Treej,, is m S,~C. Intuitively, this is the point in r where the test is performed. Note that if we consider two adversaries C, C' E 27 and two corresponding points c and c' in~q,~and TA,~,, the sample spaces S,,~and S,,,, used by p, at these two points will in general be different: at c, it is C that determines at which point in each run in the tree that p, considers possible at c the test will be performed, while at c' it is C' that makes this determination.
Notice that, in the presence of this third type of adversary, it is no longer the case that all sample space assignments defined in asynchronous systems are standard assignments. For example, it no longer need be the case that c E SIC,.
Intuitively, playing against' a copy of yourself places no constraints on this third type of adversary. To make this precise, once we fix a set of adversaries of the first type .@ (and a copy of yourself as the type-2 adversary) and consider the resulting system, we can take pts(.d) to be the set of all possible adversaries of the third type in this system. Let S'Pt' be the sample space assignment Y'c defined above where @ = pts(~), and let @ Pt' be the induced probability assignment. PROPOSITION 10.
@r'oS', c I= Kj"~lp ifl @p", c 1= K}"' @lq, for elery fact p, agent p,, and point c.
The proof of this result shows that YP"'t can be understood in asynchronous systems in terms of an adversary that chooses as the time for the test to be performed the worst possible time from p,'s point of view. 17
'7Another interpretation of this result is that the language obtained by closing a set of formulas under the standard Boolean connective and the modal operators K," cannot distinguish the assignments @P"'* and WvPt'. We note that the richer language of [6] can distinguish these awgnments. that every point in the cut is a time k point for some k falling in some interval of width 8. We can also generalize the notion of type three adversary slightly so as not to require that it choose a cut, but rather have it choose at most one point per run. The intuition here is that this adversary simply does not give p, the chance to bet in certain runs. In our coin-tossing example, such an adversary could allow p, to bet on heads only when the coin has landed tails.
The issue of defining reasonable adversaries of the third type deserves further study.
We close this section with a comparison of our definition of probability in asynchronous systems with that of Fischer and Zuck [6] . The probability assignment they use in the asynchronous setting has much the same flavor as that of our @ Pt'. Rather than assuming that the adversary chooses at a point c a cut of points through Tree,,,, however, they assume that the adversary chooses a cut of global states through Tree,,~; that is, a set of global states appearing in Tree, , with the property that no two global states lie on the same run. Intuitively, this means that if the adversa~performs the test at one point, it performs the test at all other points with the same global state. This seems like a reasonable restriction, but it leads to some unexpected consequences.
Let us call the class of adversaries considered in [6] state, let yt'te be the sample space assignment~~defined above where S = state, and let @s[ate be the induced probability assignment. Rather than giving formal definitions here, we give an example to show how @St'tC differs from 9 P". Consider a system in which p, tosses a biased coin that lands heads with probability 0.99 and tails with probability 0.01. The system consists of two runs we can denote by h and t and four points corresponding to times O and 1 in runs h and t. The computation tree has only three nodes, a root R encoding the points (h, O) and (t. O), a node H corresponding to the point (h, 1), and a node T corresponding to (t, 1). Suppose pz is able to distinguish only the point (h, 1) from the remaining three points and suppose that q is the fact "the coin lands heads"
(so that q is true at (h, O) and (h, 1), and false, elsewhere). Let c be a time O point, say (t, O), and consider the probability with which p: knows p with respect to .9 p" and~'tat'.
An adversary in pts can either choose {(h. O), (t. 0)1 or {(h, O), (t, 1)} as the set of points to perform the experiment; q is true with probability 0.99 with respect to both sets. It follows that~~pts, C-I= K: '99; in fact we have Ypt',~R K~l~~f)W~. Similarly, an adversary in state can choose either the node R or the node T as a state at which to perform the experiment, since these are the cuts of global states contained in {R, T}. The choice of R corresponds to the adversary in pts that chooses {(h, O), (t, 0)}. However, the choice of T does not correspond to {(h, O), (t, 1)}. In fact, there is no adversary in state corresponding to this adversary in pts, since it would amount to choosing the nodes R and T, both of which lie on the same run. With respect to the choice R, p holds with probability 0.99; with respect to the choice T, q holds with probability O. Thus, we get @'tat', c R K~O'" 'g]q. In some sense it seems that JZpt' is giving the more reasonable answer here. Since pz knows that, a priori, the coin will land heads with high probability, and its information has not eliminated either run, it should still consider heads extremely (1) the fixed point axiom: CG p = E~( q A CG q).
(2) the induction rule: From $~E~( + A p) infer +~C~p.
The first statement says that C~p is a fixed point of the equation X= EG(q AX).
It can be shown to follow from the induction rule that Cc; q is the greatest fixed point, and thus is implied by all other fixed points of this equation [14] . In fact, it is common to define common knowledge as the greatest fixed point of this equation, since this is the stronger definition in general and is the definition that extends most easily to other settings [2, 13, 20] . The induction rule-in the simple case that~-q-says that if q is a "public fact" in the sense that everyone knows q whenever p is true, then it is common knowledge whenever it is true.
1sNote that this example also shows that the adversaries in state are examples of the more general adversaries discussed above, that do not necessarily choose one point per run. For example, the adversary choosing the global state T does not choose a point in the run h.
What Halpern and Moses show is that common knowledge of a certain fact is a necessary condition for coordinated attack. They also show that common knowledge of nontrivial facts cannot be attained in systems such as systems in which messages may fail to be delivered, and hence that coordinated attack is not possible in systems such as ours (cf.
[10]). Given this relationship between deterministic attack and common knowledge, it is natural to ask about a relationship between probabilistic attack and probabilistic common knowledge.
By direct analogy to the fixed-point definition of common knowledge, Fagin and Halpern [2] define probabilistic common knowledge of p to be the greatest fixed point of the X -E;( q A X), where E: p -A~,~~; IKl"q. This definition is not equal to the infinite conjunction of the formulas (E:)~q for k > 0, but it is easy to show that this definition satisfies the obvious analogues of the fixed-point axiom and induction rule given above.
Returning to deterministic attack, notice that since Pc% is true at all points, the induction rule implies C~pcA holds at all points. In fact, since C~pcĩ mplies pcA, an alternative specification of coordinated attack is that Cc PCh olds at all points (and not that y+,, holds at all points). Suppose we fix some a > 0 and take the specification of probabilistic attack to be that C: pc~holds at all points. Are there implementations of this version of probabilistic attack'? The answer depends on the choice of probability assignment. Stronger assignments yield stronger notions of probabilistic common knowledge, and hence make stronger requirements of the implementation.
Consider the assignment .~'"t. Here the opponent offering an agent a bet knows the entire global state at every point.
If there is any point where the attack is uncoordinated, then no later point of any run extending this point can satisfy qc~. At this point pc~holds with probability O (according to~~"t), so it easily follows that C: qc~cannot hold at all points. This says that an algorithm achieves probabilistic coordinated attack with respect to 9 '"t iff it achieves coordinated attack. Since coordinated attack is known to be unattainable in asynchronous systems, we cannot get probabilistic coordinated attack either with respect to such a strong opponent.
Next consider the assignment LPP"". Here the opponent offering the bet has precisely the same knowledge as the agent itself. Consequently. if it is possible to reach a point at which the agent can determine from its local state that no run extending the point can satisfy pc~. the agent knows pck does not hold, and hence neither does C: pc~. Consequently, our first implementation CA, of the probabilistic attack problem does not have the property that C: qc-holds at all points (with respect to @ P"'t ), but our second implementation CA~does. This can be proved by first observing that E; pcA holds at all points (with respect to .7' ('") and hence by the induction rule (taking the formula v in the rule to be true), so does C: PC~.
Notice that with respect to any consistent probability assignment, if at some point an agent in G knows qck does not hold, then C; qc~cannot hold at this point (since C: PC* implies E: pcA by the fixed point axiom, while K,~p implies 1 E: PCA for all i c G). Consequently, it cannot be the case that C: Pc,4 holds at all points of CA1 with respect to any consistent assignment. Is it possible for C: pc~to hold at all points of CA~with respect to any probability assignment? Since this algorithm guarantees qcA holds with probability a, taken over the runs, the obvious solution is to make the assignment mimic the probability distribution on the runs. In particular, consider @p''or. It is easy to see that with this assignment, every agent knows qcA with probability a at all points of the system. Since E; pc~holds at all points, it follows by the induction rule that C: pcA holds at all points as well. We summarize our discussion in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 11
(a)~iYtachieLes probabilistic coordinated uttack with respect to PJ'"(" but not (b) CAZ "achieL'es probabilistic coordinated attack with respect to @'P('" (and 9P''"') but not @f L".
(c) A protocol achiel'es probabilistic coordinated attack with respect to @f{'f iff it achieues coordinated attack.
Hence, no such protocol exists in which the generals actually attack, bat do not attack when no messages are deliL)ered.
This proposition shows how increasing the power of the opponent (moving down in the lattice) strengthens the kind of guarantees that can be made for probabilistic attack. As we have already seen, @Pr'"r corresponds to probability over the runs. And indeed, CA, does give us coordination in almost all the runs. However, as we observed in Section 4, by following protocol CA,, general A can attack even though A is certain that the attack will not be coordinated.
Since CAZ achieves coordinated attack with respect to~p"'t, this situation cannot arise with CAZ. Finally, part (c) of Proposition 11 shows that achieving coordinated attack with high probability with respect to the knowledge of an agent that knows everything that has happened in the past is too much to expect in this setting. Note that all of the probability assignments agree at time O, and the probability they assign to a set of points is identical to the probability of the set of runs going through those points; that is, if c is a time O point in~~q and SZ'A(q) is the set of runs in~satisfying a fact q about the run, then However, at later times, it is only @p""r that agrees with the initial probability on runs. Thus, for the other probability assignments, saying that p holds with probability greater than a at all points (r, k) in~i according to p, will generally be a stronger statement than saying it holds with probability a taken over the runs of y~q.
Of course, it is perfectly conceivable we might want to consider probability assignments besides those that we have discussed above, which will make yet more guarantees. If S,, < satisfies REQl and REQZ, then P,,. is a probability space.
PROOF.
We must show (see [11] ) that %,,. 
and hence PI , is countably additive.
[n a synchronous system, if Y is a consistent, standard assignment and _Y( @ ) iv .~tuted generated, then p is measurable with respect to .9 for ull facts q Cl&'(@). If P and S" are standard assignments satisjjing S" < Y', then for eL'ery agent pl and point c, the set S,,~can be partitioned into sets of the form S:,, with d = S,, C. In a gwchronous system, if P' and 9 are consistent, standard assignments satisfying P' <F, then for all agents p,, all points c, and all measurable subsets S' E ;Z; .
(a) S'~~, (so that, in particular, S; , itself is a measurable subset of S,,,), (b) P,, C(S:, C) >0, For all facts p measurable with respect to P], all agents p,, and all points c, the rule Bet( q, a ) is PJ-sofe forpl at c iff YJ, c i= K,"q. , and since G~and Tree; , are disjoint, that P(3( Tree/,,)) < 1 -W( 9( G~)) <~; so p(@(S, , )) >~(,'#( Tree; ,)) as desired. Now let 9 be the probability assignment induced by $ and r, and let .91 be the probability assignment induced by YJ and~. Furthermore, let GC be the set of points with global state c, let~be the fact which is true precisely of the points in GL, and let p = -~. Since Y'(@) is sufficiently rich, it follows that 4 q~; since Y( cD) is closed under negation, it follows that p = T* E~(~).
Since both Y' and Y] are standard, and hence inclusive and state generated, it follows that G, g S, , n Treef,.
Since p is false only at points in G,, and since G' is contained in both S(', and Trec~,, it is easy to see that
and Furthermore, since F is uniform (it is standard), any set S,,,, not equal to S,,, is disjoint from S,,, and hence from G,, so p, ,( S,,,(p)) = p, .(S, ,) = 1 for all such sets S, ,. It follows that~, C % K,"q.
On the other hand, since w(3(S, , )) > p(ti(Tree~, )) and p(@'(GC)) >0, it is easy to see that a > aJ. Let j' be the strategy in which p, offers a payoff of I/a for q at points of W,(C), and suppose p, uses the rule Bet( q. a). Clearly Wj = Wj(p, a) is l/a -1 on Treej,, (p) and -1 off this set. Thus,
1
(1 <--la-(1-a)=o, a' which means Bed p, a ) is not .@J-safe for p, at c. u
Note that the universal quantification over transition probability assignments is crucial in this proof. Given a fact~false only at points in the intersection of S, , and Trce~,, the proof shows that a necessary condition for &z', c I= A',ap to imply that Bet( p, a ) is safe for p, at c is that the measure of the runs through S1,. is less than or equal to the measure of the runs through Tree:,,. In fact, this is a sufficient condition as well. For any given~, it may be possible to construct a set S, ,~Trec~, satisfying this condition: but the only way to satisfy this condition for all~is to take S[ , G Tree;~. In a synchronous system, if Y and P are consistent, standard assignments satisfying 9' <9, then A similar argument shows (~,,~)*( S,, ,1(q)) s~. Since these arguments hold for all d = .%(c), it follows that @', c > K:" 'Ip. We now prove part (b). Since Y' <~, it follows that S,,~contains two disjoint sets ,SY,, and ,Sj,~for some agent p, and points c and d. Let + be the fact true at precisely the points in the set G, of points with c's global state. and let p =~~. Notice that since 9' is standard and hence state generated, G, is contained in S: , and disjoint from S;,~. If S(0) is sufficiently rich, then += 0, and hence p = -I~=S7(@).
Since G, c S;,, c S,,,. the fact q holds with probability 1 with respect to all probability spaces determined by Y' and @ except S:,, and S1,~. Since 9' s 9, Proposition 5 tells us that~~,, can be obtained from K,~by conditioning on S;,. It is easy to see, therefore, that~holds with probability with respect to S: ,, and probability with respect to S,,~. Since W, ,(S; , ) < w,, ,(S,,, ) = 1, however, it is easy to see that a' < a. It follows that 9, c R Kj"llp but q', c i# Kf"llp. On the other hand,~q holds with probability O with respect to all probability spaces determined by~' and~except S~, and S,~. The fact 7 p holds with probability 1 -a' with respect to S;,, and probability 1 -a with respect to s,,. Since a' < a, we have 1 -a < 1 -a'; setting~= 1 -a, it follows that~, c R~~)~1 7~but .qa',~~@j cl -9.D PROOF.
Recall that we have fixed the class w' of adversaries of the first type, and that for the adversary of the second type, each agent bets against itself. Consider the adversary C q pts(.w') of the third type mapping an agent p, shows that the supremum of (~~~)* (Sln~( q)) -taken over all adversaries~q pts(.w)-is precisely (~~~t )* (T'ree, J( p) Suppose p~first says it holds an ace. Conditioning on this information, p2 computes the probability p~holds both aces to be 1/6 1 Pr(AIB) = -5/6 '~"
As a result of learning pl holds at least one ace, the probability according to PZ that P, holds both aces increases. Suppose pl then says it holds the ace of spades. Conditioning on this additional information, pz computes the probability pl holds both aces to be 1/6 1 Pr(AIC) = -1/2=:"
As a result of learning not only that pl holds at least one ace, but that it actually holds the ace of spades, the probability according to pz that p, holds both aces increases even more. Similarly, Pr(AID) = 1/3. But is this second computation reasonable? When pz learns B, then p2
knows that pl has either the ace of spades or the ace of hearts. When pz learns C, then pz knows that pl definitely has the ace of spades. Is it reasonable for the probability pz places on event A, that p, holds two aces, to increase from 1/5 to 1/3 simply as a result of learning which of the two aces pl has? It seems just as reasonable to argue that the information about which ace pl actually has is useless, and pz's probability of A should not change upon hearing that C (or D) holds. As Shafer points out, the right way for pz to update its probability of A depends on what protocol the agents are following. If the agents had agreed p] would first reveal whether it held an ace, and then whether it held the ace of spades, then the increase seems reasonable: If pl says it holds an ace, then p2's learning pl does not hold the ace of spades causes pz's probability that pl holds both aces to go down to O; so learning that pl does hold the ace of spades should make pz's probability go up. On the other hand, if the agents were following a protocol whereby p, first reveals whether it has an ace, and then, if it does, reveals the suit of one of the aces it holds, choosing between hearts and spades at random if it has both aces, then pz's probability should not change as a result of hearing that p, holds the ace of spades. z{) We leave it to the reader to construct the computation trees corresponding to the two protocols described above, and to check that using 9P''", we do indeed get the right probabilities in each case. Again, the key point here is that we need the protocol to be completely specified in order to appropriately compute the conditional probabilities.
B.2. Safe Bets and Nonrneaswwble Facts
Recall that the statement of Theorem 7 says that for measurable facts, .~] determines safe bets against p,. The condition of measurability is required in order for the use of expectation in the definition of a safe bet to make sense.
Remember that Bet( p, a) is safe for p, at c if lSJ(Wf ) = E~, C,,,~,$ J3f( P, a)) is nonnegative for all points d agent p, considers possible at c, and for all strategies f for pJ. We computed in the proof of Theorem 7 that E~( PL ) = Fw, ,1(S, ,1(P)) -L where B is the payoff offered by P, in S,,~(St~was actually Tree;,~). In order for P,,~(S,~( p)) to be well defined, however, S,, ,J(p) must be a measurable subset of S,, ,1. which means q must be measurable. In fact, Theorem 7 holds for nonmeasurable facts as well, but we must first
give a meaningful definition of expectation for nonmeasurable events. The intuition behind the inner and outer measures w. and W* of a measure space (S, %, p) is that w, (S') and w*(S') give upper and lower bounds on the probability of S'; if S' is actually a measurable set, of course, these bounds are equal to the actual probability. This is made precise by a classical result [11] , which says that if (S,.'7', v) extends (S, :X p,) (in that :Y' 2 ;2' and w and v agree on %), then for all sets X c :2"', we have w*(X) s V(X) s P*(X). Moreover, the bounds described by the inner and outer measure are actually attainable, in that for all subsets X G S, there is a probability space (S. .T', v) extending (S, 2: p) such that X q % and v(X) = P*(X); a similar result holds in the case of outer measure. We want to extend these ideas to expected value. More precisely, we would like to define a notions of inner expected value and outer expected value for a "nonmeasurable" random variable X that give, respectively, lower and upper bounds on what should be the expected value of X if we were to extend the measure space as above to make X measurable. This requires some work in general, but in the special case where X takes on only two values, it can be dune in a straightforward way. If the two values taken on by X are x and y, with x > y, then we define the inner and outer expectations of a random variable X by E*(X) =x~*(X =x) +yv*(X= y), and ET(X) =x~"(x=x) +y~x.x=y). 
